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Public Access to Lands Annually
Flooded: A Constitutional Analysis of
Section 2016 of the California Fish and
Game Code
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are... the seas,
and consequently the shores of the sea; no man therefore is prohibited
from approaching any part of the seashore... I
All that tract of land, over which the greatest winter flood extends
itself, is the seashore.2
Nearly every winter in northern California, water from swollen rivers
flows or is diverted onto private land, creating prime habitat for
thousands of waterfowl.3 Waterfowl hunters have navigated these
floodwaters since the turn of the century, usually without permission
from the owner of the flooded land.' Entries of this nature bring
two fundamental rights into conflict. The right to protect property
from trespass is an inalienable right secured by the California
Constitution.' On the other hand, the right of the public to have ac-
cess to navigable waters also is protected by the California
Constitution.
The conflict between the rights of persons who own land annually
flooded and the right of the public to traverse navigable waters was
considered recently by the California Legislature. Prior to 1982, sec-
tion 2016 of the California Fish and Game Code7 forbade unauthorized
entry onto private property to hunt. The law spoke only of entry
onto land, however, leaving open the issue whether unauthorized en-
try onto private lands covered with floodwater was unlawful. To set-
tle this point, section 2016 was amended in 1982 to require landowner
consent for entry onto private land that is "temporarily inundated"
1. T. COOPER, THE INSTITUTES oF JUSTINLAN 67-8 (3rd. ed. 1852).
2. Id.
3. San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, Jan. 22, 1984, at CIO, col. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Chronicle Article] (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
4. Id.
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, §1.
6. CAL. CONST. art. X, §4.
7. All section references are to CAL. FISH & GAME CODE unless otherwise specified.
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by water.8 This action was taken at the behest of landowners in the
northern Sacramento Valley angered by property damage, free use
of hunting facilities, and possible civil liability for injuries occuring
on their land associated with those who enter flooded lands without
permission to hunt waterfow9
By amending section 2016 in 1982, the legislature, while protecting
private property rights, placed control over access to navigate flood-
waters in private hands. The amount of acreage open to hunters who
neither own waterfowl habitat nor belong to a hunting club is thereby
greatly reduced."0 This author will show that this restriction placed
on public access to floodwaters is unconstitutional because the law
interferes with the constitutional right of navigation in a manner
beyond the power of the legislature.
To reach this conclusion, this author initially will discuss the
legislative history of section 2016."1 Next, the author will discuss ar-
ticle X section 4 of the California Constitution. This provision will
be shown to create a public trust easement on lands beneath navigable
water and a constitutional right to use navigable waters. 2 With the
public trust easement and constitutional right of navigation established,
the author will show that floodwaters of the type used by public water-
fowl hunters are navigable waters under the current test for navigability
employed by California courts. 3 The author then will show that this
conclusion is not militated against by statutes and cases that limit
the ability of certain floodwaters to be legally navigable.' 4 Next, this
author will address the argument made by proponents of section 2016
that the law impinges only upon the right to hunt and not upon the
constitutional right of navigation and is thus not unconstitutional.
The author will refute this argument by discussing cases and the opi-
nion of the California Attorney General that hold the right of naviga-
tion to include the right to hunt. 5
Having firmly established the constitutional right to navigate flood-
waters for the purpose of hunting, the exercise of this right will be
shown not to interfere with the inalienable right to protect property
8. See infra note 31 and accompanying text for partial text of CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§2016 as amended by 1982 Cal. Stats. c.1607, §1 at 6429.
9. See Chronicle Article, supra note 3 at cols. 2-3.
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 81-104 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 130-45 and accompanying text.
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from trespass.' 6 The author then will discuss the limits on the power
of the legislature to restrict access to navigable waters as mandated
by Article X section 4 of the California Constitution. Using this stan-
dard, section 2016 will be shown to be an unconstitutional act because
the law impinges on the constitutional right of navigation and places
control over access to navigable waters in private hands. 7 Finally,
the author will offer suggestions on how the problems faced by land-
owners can be remedied in a constitutional manner. These problems
are discussed in connection with the legislative history of section 2016.18
THE HISTORY OF SECTION 2016 OF THE CAin oRu'A FISH AND
GAME CODE
In England, the king owned the wild creatures of the realm and
had power to preserve and protect game reserves for the common
good.' 9 This concept was adopted in America, with the individual
states replacing the sovereign as owner and manager of wild animals."0
In California, the notion of public ownership of game was made clear
in People v. Truckee Lumber Company.2' In Truckee Lumber, the
state successfully enjoined lumber mill operators from dumping sawdust
and other refuse into the Truckee River. The California Supreme Court
found this pollution, which killed fish in the river, to be injurious
to public property rights in the wild fish.22
The ability of the government to manage game was made clear in
Ex Parte Maier.23 In Maier, the California Supreme Court upheld
a statute prohibiting the sale of venison to be a proper exercise of
the police power.2 1
With public ownership rights in game and the authority of the state
to manage game established, various laws were developed to conserve
wildlife and habitat. One of these laws, section 627 of the Penal Code,
was enacted in 1895.25 This law was the ancestor legislation of later
parts of the Fish and Game Code, including section 2016. As adopted
from the Penal Code in 1967, section 2016 made unlawful any
16. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
19. II W. BLACKSTONE, COIMENTA~ms 417-419.
20. Ex Parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 37 P. 402 (1894).
21. 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897).
22. Id. at 399, 48 P. at 374.
23. 103 Cal. 476, 37 P. 402 (1894).
24. Id.
25. Enacted by 1895 Cal. Stats., c. 202, §1, at 258.
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unauthorized entry onto the land of another for the purpose of
hunting.2 6
Subsequent to the enactment of this law in 1895, flooded private
lands became popular hunting areas. Over the years, landowners ex-
perienced property damage caused by persons who had entered private
property via floodwaters without consent.2 Further, much private land
that had been improved at great expense by duck clubs to attract
waterfowl was used by the public without consent and without charge. 8
Section 2016, prior to being amended, could have been read to pre-
vent unconsented entry of this type. Under the maxim cujus est solum,
ejus est usque ad coleum,2 1 a landowner owns the space above the
soil. Thus, a hunter who enters private land by boat has entered,
in a physical sense, onto the land of another as much as a hunter
on foot. The question whether entry by water was precluded by sec-
tion 2016, however, was not resolved by a California appellate court.
This uncertainty, coupled with constituent owners of flooded land
prompted Senator Ray Johnson of Chico to amend section 2016 to
restrict the ability of the public to traverse floodwaters over private
land.3 0 Section 2016, as amended in 1982 reads in part:
26. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §2016 prior to being amended by 1982 Cal. Stats., c. 1607
§1 read in part:
It is unlawful to enter any lands under cultivation or enclosed by a fence, belonging
to, or occupied by, another, or to enter any uncultivated or unenclosed lands where
signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile
along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering such lands, for the
purpose of discharging any firearm or taking or destroying any mammal or bird
on such lands without having first obtained written permission from the owner of
such lands, or his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof.
27. See Chronicle Article, supra note 2.
28. Id.
29. Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (rev, 5th
ed. 1979).
30. See Chronicle Article, supra note 2. The first bill introduced by Senator Johnson was
designed to close a loophole in the law which the then Assemblyman Johnson authored in
1972 to remedy the trespass problem faced by many of his constituents. In 1972 the legislature
amended section 100 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, CAL. HARu. & NAY. CODE amended
by 1972 Cal. Stats., c. 1072, §1 which declares all navigable waters in the state to be public
ways. The amendment specifically excluded floodwaters from those waters capable of being
navigable. Id. Thus, floodwaters could not be public ways to which a public right of naviga-
tion right would attach. The amendment, however, restricted the definition of floodwaters to
those waters on land due to extraordinary flooding. Id. Thus, annual floodwaters, the type
used by navigable waterfowl hunters could still be navigable waters under the statute.
In 1982 Senator Johnson introduced legislation that would have amended Harbors and Naviga-
tion Code section 100 to remedy this anomaly in the statute. This 1982 bill redefined the term
"floodwaters" expressly to include annual floodwaters resulting from flood control diversions.
S.B. 1920, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. (amended in Senate April 22, 1982, amended in Assembly June
25, 1982)(copies on file with Pacific Law Journal). This bill was amended in committee to
remove entirely the definition of the term "floodwaters" from the statute. Id. See SENATE
FimAL HIsToRY, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. 1117 (1982). Both versions of the bill would have precluded
floodwaters from being navigable and hence could not be "public ways" under Harbors and
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It is unlawful to enter any lands under cultivation or enclosed by
a fence, or belonging to, or occupied by, another, or to enter any
uncultivated or unenclosed lands, including lands temporarily inun-
dated by waters flowing outside the established banks of a river,
stream, slough, or other waterway, where signs forbidding trespass
are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all
exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering such lands,
for the purpose of discharging any firearm or taking or destroying
any mammal or bird, including any waterfowl, on such lands without
having first obtained written permission from the owner of such
lands .... 31 (emphasis supplied to show new language).
The effect of the amendment to section 2016 is clear. Many
thousands of acres of flooded lands, which are prime waterfowl habitat
and thus excellent hunting grounds, are no longer accessible to the
public.32 Further, hunters who have hunted on floodwaters for many
years are now subject to criminal liability.3 Although section 2016
addresses valid landowner concerns, the law is unconstitutional if it
impinges on a constitutional right in a manner beyond the power of
the legislature.3" A discussion of the constitutional right of naviga-
tion is thus necessary to an analysis of the constitutionality of sec-
tion 2016.
TlE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF NAVIGATION
The constitutional right of navigation, with which section 2016 con-
flicts, is expressly protected by article X section 4 of the California
Constitution." In addition to establishing a constitutional right of
navigation, article X section 4 has been held to embody the public
trust doctrine. 6 These two concepts have been held by California courts
to protect and describe similar rights. The public trust doctrine
generally has been applied by courts in deciding whether a particular
piece of property is burdened by an easement for access and naviga-
Navigation Code 100. The proposed legislation would have thus abolished statutory authority
for the public to use navigable floodwaters on private land. Although the amendment to Har-
bors and Navigation Code section 100 was passed by the California Senate, the proposed law
stalled in the Assembly. Id. Senator Johnson, joined by Assemblyman Herger, then rewrote
the bill to amend Fish and Game Code section 2016. Id.
31. CAL. FISH & GAmE CODE §2016.
32. See Chronicle Article supra note 3 (the author of this article stated that over 100,000
acres of land used by public hunters would be affected by the new legislation).
33. Id.
34. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912); People v. California Fish Co.,
166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
35. CAL. CONST. art. X, §4. See infra notes 37-41 for full text of this provision.
36. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); P.G.&E. v Superior
Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 253, 193 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1983).
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tion in favor of the public." The constitutional right of navigation,
however, has been used by courts in deciding disputes over the right
of the public to navigate a waterway.3" Using either theory, Califor-
nia courts are steadfast in recognizing a constitutionally protected
public right of navigation.
A. The Constitutional Provision Guarantying the Navigation
Right
The provision in the California Constitution that California courts
have interpreted to protect the public right of navigation was included
in the 1879 Constitution to assure that public access to the water-
front and navigable waters would not be impeded.3 9 This enactment
was desired by the authors of the 1879 constitution because prior
legislatures, shortly after statehood in 1850, had sold large tracts of
tidelands to private individuals."0 Fearing a monopolization of all front-
age to navigable water in the state by private persons, the legislature
adopted article XV sections 2 and 3 (later renumbered article X sec-
tion 4 and 3, respectively)." Section 3, as renumbered, prohibits the
sale to private persons of tidelands within two miles of an incorporated
city. 42 Section 4, as renumbered, protects the navigation right and
reads as follows:
No individual, partnership or corporation claiming or possessing the
frontage of title lands in a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other
navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the
right-of-way to such water whenever it is required for any public
purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water;
and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal
construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters
of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof.43
37. See National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983); People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); City
of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980); Marks
v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); State v. Superior Court
(Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied 454 U.S. 865 (1981);
State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert.
denied 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
38. People ex rel. Younger v. El Dorado County, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 157 Cal. Rptr.
815 (3d Dist. 1979).
39. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 522-23, 606 P.2d 363, 366-67,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 330-31 (1980). See also Debates and Proceedings of the California Con-
stitutional Convention 1878-79 at 1478-81 (text of legislative debates over the wisdom of article
X §4 and related provisions dealing with the waterfront).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. CAL. CONST. art. X, §3.
43. CAL. CONST. art. X, §4. Other states have similar constitutional provisions. See e.g.
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B. California Case Law Describing the Navigation Right
A leading case interpreting article X section 4 of the California
Constitution as creating a public navigation right is Forestier v.
Johnson." In Forestier, the California Supreme Court was asked to
enjoin alleged trespassers from navigating on Fly's Bay, a tidally in-
fluenced side channel of the Napa River. The court refused to issue
an injunction, finding a public trust easement for navigation, as man-
dated by article X section 4, to be implicit in the grant of Fly's Bay
from the state to private persons." Further, the Court held that the
defendants were exercising the right of navigation secured to the public
by this constitutional provision." Since Fly's Bay was tidally influenced,
Forestier applied the public navigation right only to navigable tidal
waters. Subsequent cases, however, extended both the constitutional
right of navigation and the public trust easement found in Forestier
to nontidal navigable waters."
One case that extended the constitutional right of navigation to in-
land navigable waters is People ex rel. Younger v. El Dorado County.48
Younger involved a county ordinance designed to ban all navigation
on the South Fork of the American River, a popular whitewater raft-
ing area. The purpose of the ordinance was to protect owners of pro-
perty adjacent to the river from the pollution, noise, trespass, and
fire danger that accompanied the rafters.4 9 In reversing the finding
of the trial court that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police
power of the local government, the California Court of Appeal stated
definitively: "The public's right of access to navigable streams is a
constitutional right." 50 The court then struck down the ordinance
ALASKA CoNsT. art. VIII §14 (free access to navigable or public waters not to be denied any
United States or state resident); ALABAmA CoNST. art. I §24 (navigable waters to remain public
highways free to citizens of United States and of state without tax, toll, or impost); TENNEssEE
Co Ts. art. I §29 (equal participation in free navigation of the Mississippi River is an inherent
right of citizens of Tennessee; it cannot, therefore, be conceded to any prince, potentate, power,
person or persons whatever) SoUTH CAROINA CONST. art. XIV §4 (all navigable water shall
remain free to citizens of the state and the United States without tax, impost or toll imposed);
MnTNESOTA CoNsT. art. II §2 (all boundary navigable waters and all such waters leading into
them, shall be common highways and free to citizens of state and of United States without
tax, duty or impost or toll); WIscoN sIN CoNsT. art. IX § (Mississippi River and all navigable
waters leading into it and Saint Lawrence River are free to inhabitants of state and to citizens
of United States without tax, impost or duty therefor).
44. 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912).
45. Id. at 35, 127 P. at 160.
46. Id. at 38, 127 P. at 162. The court stated "the public right of navigation [is] secured
by the said constitutional provision" (referring to article XV section 2, later changed to article
X section 4).
47. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
48. 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (3d Dist. 1979).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 406, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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because the rafting ban "denies the constitutional right of the public
the use of and access to a navigable stream." 5' Younger thus extends
the constitutional right of navigation to inland navigable waters.
C. The Public Trust Easement for Navigation
The public trust easement for navigation found in Forestier to be
protected by article X section 4 of the state constitution has ancient
origins. Founded in Roman law, the public trust concept evolved in
England, where the sovereign held all the navigable waters and the
land beneath them in trust for public navigation, commerce, and
fishery.5 2 This doctrine was adopted in the United States, where the
states succeeded to the trusteeship of navigable waters and underly-
ing land upon admission to the union.53 As exemplified by the deci-
sion in Forestier, many California public trust cases involved public
use of tidal waters near the coast." ' The public trust easement for
navigation was extended to nontidal, navigable waters, however, in
State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon)55 and State of Califor-
nia v. Superior Court (Fogerty).56
In Lyon and Fogerty the supreme court held that private land on
the shore of Clear Lake and Lake Tahoe, respectively, was burdened
by the public trust up to the high water mark." The court held that
because the state succeeded to the ownership of lands beneath non-
tidal navigable waters up to the high water mark upon admission to
the union, subsequent grants of these lands to private persons included
a public trust easement up to the high water mark." The public thus
was found to have a right to use these lands and the waters on them
for navigation, commerce, fishing, and recreation. 9 Further, the court
in Fogerty stated that the modern seasonal high water mark, even
as increased by manmade structures, rather than the level the water
would reach under natural conditions, defines the boundary of the
51. Id. at 407, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
52. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention 68 MicH. L. Rav. 471 (1970)(history of the public trust doctrine).
53. Id.
54. See People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); City of Berkeley
v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980); Marks v. Whitney,
6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
55. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
56. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
57. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied 454 U.S. 865
(1981); Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied 454 U.S. 865
(1981).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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trust on nontidal navigable waters.60 Thus, under Lyon and Fogerty,
the constitutionally based public trust easement for navigation has
been extended to the current high water mark of nontidal, navigable
waterways in California.
D. The Relationship Between the Public Trust Easement and the
Constitutional Right of Navigation
Although Forestier made clear that the constitutional right of naviga-
tion and the public trust easement are protected by Article X section
4 of the California Constitution, few cases since have discussed the
distinctions or overlap between the two doctrines. Two California Court
of Appeal decisions, however, provide an analysis of the relationship
between the two rights.
In P.G.&.E. v. Superior Court,6' an electric utility, P.G.&E., sought
immunity from liability under Civil Code section 846,62 for injuries
sustained by a person on land owned by the utility. Under Civil Code
section 846, a landowner is relieved of the duty to keep the premises
safe for use by the public for recreational purposes. In this case, the
plaintiff had come into contact with a P.G.&E. power line while he
was in a catamaran on Lake Shasta.63 P.G.&E. claimed that since
it owned the land over which the power line ran, the plaintiff was
on P.G.&E. "premises" entitling the utility to immunity under Civil
Code section 846. The court rejected this argument, stating that the
constitutionally derived public trust easement attached to all navigable
waters in the state and to the lands beneath them, including the
navigable lake in issue.64 The finding that the lake bed was burdened
with the public trust meant that the plaintiff, as a member of the
public, had a constitutional right to navigate the waters of the lake.65
The court concluded that the plaintiff, being where he had a con-
stitutional right to be when he was injured, had not entered onto
any lands of P.G.&E. and that the utility company was therefore not
shielded from liability. 66
60. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied 454 U.S.
865 (1981).
61. 145 Cal. App. 3d 253, 193 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1983).
62. CALn. CIV. CODE §846. At the time of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, the law
provided that "an owner of an estate in real property.. .owes no duty of care to keep the
premises safe for entry or use by others" for designated "recreational purpose(s)" including
"water sports." The purpose of the statute is to encourage landowners to let the public use
their land for recreational purposes by relieving the owner of possible tort liability for injury
incurred by a member of the public using the land. Id.
63. P.G.&E., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 255-56, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
64. Id. at 258, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
65. Id. at 258, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
66. Id.
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P.G.&E. clarifies the relationship between the public trust doctrine
and the constitutional right of navigation. The court stated that Arti-
cle X section 4 creates both doctrines, with the public trust easement
attaching to land and water and the navigation right attaching to
people.6 7 Once the public trust easement is found to burden a body
of water, the public has a constitutional right to navigate the water.
Although P.G.&E., like Forestier, holds the public trust easement
and the constitutional right of navigation to be interwoven, one Califor-
nia Court of Appeal case has held that the public has a right to use
navigable waters on land that is not within the public trust. In Bohn
v. Albertson,68 a reclaimed island in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
became flooded because of a levee break. Following the inundation
of the island, members of the public fished and boated on the waters. 69
Several years after the levee break, the private landowner sought to
enjoin these alleged trespasses."0 Although the lands involved were
not within the public trust since the navigable water on the land was
not present when the grant of the land from the state was made,
the court found that the public still had a right to use the waterway.7'
The court said: "As the waters are navigable, then, although the title
to the lands thereunder still remains in the owners and they have the
right to reclaim, the public, until the land is reclaimed, has the right
of navigation and fishery. '"7 2 Bohn thus holds that land and navigable
waters outside the public trust are nonetheless objects of the con-
stitutional right of navigation.
In summary, the California constitution has been held to burden
land beneath nontidal, navigable waters with a public trust easement
for navigation. The constitutional provision protecting the public trust
also creates the constitutional right in the public to use the navigable
waters over lands held in the public trust. Further, the navigation
right attaches to navigable waters over land that, due to avulsive
flooding, are not within the public trust. Under either doctrine, the
67. Id. at 258-59, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
68. 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1951).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 749, 238 P.2d at 135. This holding is significant in light of the recent United
States Supreme Court decision Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission
and City of Los Angeles, - U.S. -, 80 L. Ed. 2d 237, 104 S.Ct. 1752 (1984). The Court
held in Summa that interests in land which had become part of the United States pursuant
to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which had been confirmed in federal patent pro-
ceedings, were not burdened by the public trust because California did not assert the trust
easement in the patent proceedings. Id. Thus, according to Bohn, although lands of the type
involved in Summa are not burdened with a public trust easement, any navigable waters on
the land are still subject to use by the public.
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public has a right to use navigable waters. Thus the essential deter-
minant in resolving whether the public has a constitutional right to
use floodwaters is whether floodwaters are navigable waters.
TiH TEST FOR NAVIGABILITY
The determination of the navigability of waterways first became
important in the United States in resolving questions of federal jurisdic-
tion under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution."
In Gibbons v. Ogden," the United States Supreme Court held that
federal power over interstate commerce included the power to regulate
commerce on navigable waters." Thus, the determination of the
navigability of water became an issue to be resolved in describing
the scope of federal jurisdiction under the commerce clause. Although
Gibbons did not provide a test for navigability, subsequent jurisdic-
tional questions involving the navigability of water prompted the Court
to do so. One test, developed in resolving the scope of federal ad-
miralty jurisdiction, was enunciated by the Supreme Court in The
Daniel Ball:76
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.17
Although this test was used to resolve an admiralty jurisdiction issue,
subsequent courts used the test to determine whether a state newly
admitted to the union obtained title to the bed of navigable streams
within the state.7 8 For commerce clause issues, the Daniel Ball stan-
dard was followed generally, though modified to require that a water-
way serve as a link to interstate commerce before federal jurisdiction
could be invoked. 79 These rigid federal tests have been relaxed, and
federal courts today appear more willing than in the past to declare
a waterway to be navigable.8"
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.3.
74. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
75. Id.
76. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
77. Id.
78. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1
(1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
79. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
80. See N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
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A. California Tests for Navigability
Congruent with federal law, the California test for determining the
navigability of a waterway has evolved from a rigid test to a more
liberal standard. In Wright v. Seymour,8" a test similar to that used
in the Daniel Ball was employed to ascertain the navigability of a
body of water. In Wright, the test used for navigability required a
stream to be susceptible to the usual commercial purposes of carry-
ing the products of the country.82 This test rapidly gave way to a
more liberal standard. In Forestier,83 for example, the California
Supreme Court held that Fly's Bay, a body of water that the court
described as capable of being navigated by small boats at high tide,
was navigable. The test was not without bounds, however, as was
apparent in Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick."' In Bolsa, the California
Supreme Court stated that an irrigation ditch, twelve to fifteen feet
wide and in some places less than two feet deep, which the defen-
dants in the case had successfully navigated to reach an estuary on
private land, was not navigable.8" The court stated: "It should be
unnecessary to add that the contention that such a ditch constitutes
a part of the navigable waters of the state, or of the nation, is a
sham as shallow as the ditch itself."8 6
As is evident from Forestier and Bolsa, the facts of each case deter-
mined the issue of navigability. This analysis was followed by the
California Court of Appeal in Bohn v. Albertson.87 In Bohn the court
had to decide whether the floodwaters that had inundated a tract of
land were navigable. In a summary of varying tests used by federal
and state courts to determine navigability, the court in Bohn stated
an elusive test, allowing the facts of each case to determine
navigability.88
The court found the waters navigable even though the water was
three and a half feet deep at low tide and contained obstructions. 9
The countervailing evidence in favor of finding the waters navigable
was the presence of many small fishing and pleasure boats on the
water.9 0 While Bohn did not state a definitive test for determining
the navigability of a stream or lake, the decision is important because
81. 69 Cal. 122, 10 P. 323 (1886).
82. Id.
83. 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912).
84. 151 Cal. 254, 90 P. 532 (1907).
85. Id. at 259, 90 P. at 534.
86. Id. at 260, 90 P. at 534.
87. 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1951).
88. Id. at 742-48, 238 P.2d at 132-135.
89. Id. at 747, 238 P.2d at 134.
90. Id.
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it advanced the premise that recreational navigation of a waterway
can support a finding that the waterway is legally navigable.
A more concrete test for navigability of waters in California was
finally stated in People ex rel. Baker v. Mack.9' In Mack, the court
of appeal was asked to abate an alleged public nuisance,92 consisting
of wires and cables placed across the Fall River. The obstructions
were strung across the river to prevent the public from navigating
the river. 93 Before the court could determine whether the cables con-
stituted a public nuisance, the court had to conclude whether the Fall
River was navigable. The court found that the river was navigable,
holding that under the modern test in California, navigable waters
are those waters "below the high water mark.. .which are capable of
being navigated by oar or motor-propelled small craft." ' 94
This language has been cited with approval by the California
Supreme Court. In National Audubon v. Superior Court,95 the case
that made the public trust a factor to be considered in state water
allocation, the court stated in a footnote that the Mack test is proper
in determining navigability for public trust purposes. 96
B. Applying the Mack Standard to Annual Floodwaters
Under the Mack standard, if annual floodwaters are below the high
water mark and capable of being traversed by a person using a small
boat, the waters are navigable. If this conclusion is reached, the con-
stitutionally protected right of navigation vests in the public to navigate
these waters. Applying the Mack standard to any particular body of
floodwater is beyond the scope of this comment. An assumption can
be made, however, that since frequent and recurrent entries onto and
navigation of annual floodwaters by public hunters have occurred,97
much annual floodwater is "capable of being navigated by oar or
motor-propelled small craft." 98
Further, floodwaters of the type used by public hunters are below
the high water mark as required under the Mack test. In Mammoth
91. 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (3rd Dist. 1971).
92. Under CAL. CIv. CODE §3479, obstructions in navigable waters are public nuisances.
93. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (3rd Dist. 1971).
94. Id. at 1050, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
95. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
96. Id. at 435 n.17, 658 P.2d at 720 n.17, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.17. The court stated:
"A waterway usable only for pleasure boating is nevertheless a navigable waterway and pro-
tected by the public trust...(citing Younger 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 and Mack
19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448)."
97. See Chronicle Article, supra note 2.
98. Mack 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1050, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454.
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Gold Dredging Co. v. Forbes,99 the California Court of Appeal stated
that the high water mark of a river is established by the average level
attained by the water during the annual wet season. 00 Also, under
Fogerty' the public trust easement extends to the current high water
mark of a lake or stream, even as affected by manmade structures. 02
Since the floodwaters used by hunters are the result of annual seasonal
flow'03 and much of the water is diverted onto the land by manmade
structures,' °0 these waters create the high water mark as described
in Mammoth Gold and Fogerty, and hence are below that level. Thus,
because most of the floodwater that annually inundates private land
in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys meets both criteria of
the Mack test and are capable of being legally navigable, a constitu-
tional right of access over these waters is vested in the public.
C. California Case Law Discussing the Navigability of
Floodwaters
Although no appellate court in California has decided t., issue
directly, the decisions that discuss whether floodwaters can be navigable
do not militate against the conclusion that annual floodwaters usec
by waterfowl hunters are navigable. In Bohn,1°O the waters present
on the private land were found navigable.'06 These waters were original-
ly the result of flooding.' 7 Thus, under Bohn, floodwaters possess
no characteristics that render them incapable of being navigable waters.
This conclusion must b tempered, however, by a realization that the
waters in Bohn had been present on the land for several years, tak-
ing on the attributes of an estuary.'0 8
In Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation and Park District,'9
the California Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether a stretch
of the Russian River was navigable, and if so, what public rights
99. 39 Cal. App. 2d 739, 104 P.2d 131 (1940).
100. Id. at 752, 104 P.2d at 138.
101. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, cert. denied 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
104. See Chronicle Article, supra note 2. See also California Attorney General Indexed Let-
ter IL-75-246 at 4-9 (this letter to the District Attorney of Sutter County concerning the
characteristics and navigability of the Butte Sink, a piece of land in the northern Sacramento
Valley that is privately owned and annually flooded. The Attorney General discusses the mechanics
of water diversions onto private land and the rights that attach thereto)(on file at the Pacific
Law Journal).
105. 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1951).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (lst Dist.)
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would accrue. This request was made by a member of the public after
a park district had sought to restrict access to the river." ' Applying
the Mack test, the court found the waters navigable and held the
public to have a right to use the river."' Regarding floodwaters, the
park district argued that a finding that the river was navigable would
mean that "every freshet of water in any defined water course
throughout the State of California during winter seasons at flood
stage""' 2 would be navigable, entitling the public to have access to
them." 3 The court allayed this concern, stating that, although waters
temporarily on land could be legally navigable, navigability in law
should not be based on navigability in fact during "infrequent or
brief" periods of flood.' 4 Thus, the dicta in Hitchings only restricts
water on land due to sporadic or unusual flooding from being
navigable. This notion coincides with statutory definitions of navigable
water and, as will be seen, does not prevent annual floodwaters of
the type used by public hunters, from being navigable.
D. Statutory Definitions of Navigable Waters
Harbors and Navigation Code section 100, as originally enacted,
stated that navigable waters are public ways for navigation and
transportation." 5 Subsequent to the enactment of this law, the liberal
Mack recreational-boating test for navigability was announced." 6 Thus,
following Mack, all waters, including floodwaters, capable of sup-
porting navigation by a small boat were navigable and hence public
ways under Harbors and Navigation Code section 100. The Califor-
nia Legislature, cognizant of this ramification of Mack, amended Har-
bors and Navigation Code section 100 to exclude floodwaters from
those waters capable of being navigable and hence precluded flood-
waters from being public ways." 7 This amendment did not effective-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 570 n.5, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 836-37 n.5.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 570, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
115. CAL. HARB. & NAY. CODE §100 (as amended by 1972 Cal. Stats. c. 1072, §1, at 6429).
116. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (3rd Dist. 1971). See supra notes
90-95 and accompanying text for discussion of the Mack test for navigability of water.
117. CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE §100, which reads in part:
Navigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of
the country are public ways for the purposes of navigation and of such transporta-
tion. However, the floodwaters of any navigable river, stream, slough or other water
course while temporarily flowing above the normal high-water mark over public or
private lands outside any established banks of such river, stream, slough, or other
watercourse are not navigable waters and nothing in this section shall be construed
as permitting trespass on any lands. For the purposes of this section, "floodwaters"
refers to that elevation of water which occurs at extraordinary times of flood and
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ly prevent all floodwaters from being navigable, however, because
the statute defined "floodwaters" as waters on land due to extra-
ordinary flooding." 8 Thus, both Hitchings and Harbors and Naviga-
tion Code section 100 only preclude waters on land due to infrequent
or extraordinary flooding from being navigable waters. Waters on
land due to normal, ordinary runoff, therefore, remain capable of
being navigable waters under California case and statutory law. Nor-
mal, ordinary runoff has been described by California courts as in-
cluding water that has temporarily escaped the banks of rivers swollen
with water from seasonal runoff.'
In Miller and Lux v. Madera Canal and Irrigation Co.,' 20 a case
involving riparian water rights, the California Supreme Court held
that waters that had escaped the banks of the Fresno River and flooded
adjacent land were still part of the river, and were not extraordinary
floodwaters.' 2 ' In a statement germane to the circumstances surround-
ing the waters used by public waterfowl hunters, the court said:
Upon this showing it cannot be said that a flow of water, occuring
as these waters are shown to occur, constitutes an extraordinary and
unusual flow. In fact, their occurrences is usual and ordinary. It
appears that they occur practically every year and are reasonably
expected to do so, and an extraordinary condition of the seasons
is presented when they do not occur; they are practically of annual
occurrence and last for several months. They are not waters gathered
into the stream as the result of occassional and unusual freshets,
but are waters which on account of climatic conditions prevailing
in the region where the Fresno River has its source are usually ex-
pected to occur, do occur, and only fail to do so when ordinary
climatic conditions are extraordinary - when a season of drouth
prevails. 22
The geographic and hydrologic conditions involved in the Miller case
are typical of the circumstances that produce much of the water on
private land used by public hunters.' 23 Thus, under Miller annual flood-
waters of the type used by hunters are ordinary high waters resulting
from normal runoff and hence are capable of being navigable waters
does not mean the water elevation of ordinary annual or recurring high waters resulting
from normal runoff.
See also note 29 for a discussion of attempts made by Senator Ray Johnson to amend this
statute. See also Review of Selected 1972 California Legislation, 4 PAC. L.J. 577 (1973).
118. See id.
119. See Miller and Lux v. Madera Canal and Irrigation Co. 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502 (1909).
120. 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502 (1909).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 76, 99 P. at 508.
123. See California water Atlas at page 5, 8, 72 (graphs and maps showing hydrologic
patterns in California).
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under Hitchings and Harbors and Navigation Code section 100.
In addition to Harbors and Navigation Code section 100, sections
101124 through 106125 of that code designate certain waters as being
legally navigable. An argument might be proffered that because this
list of navigable waters does not contain any bodies of water that
are the result of flooding, floodwaters may not legally be navigable.
This argument is easily refuted by reference to Bohn.'2 6 In Bohn, as
has been shown, the waters on private land due to a levee break were
held to be navigable, the absence of the floodwaters from the list
of statutorily recognized navigable waters notwithstanding.'27 Further,
in City of Los Angeles v. Aitken,'28 judicial notice was taken of the
navigability of Mono Lake. This finding of navigability was made
despite the absence of Mono Lake from the list of navigable water-
ways given in the Harbors and Navigation Code.' 29 Thus, the annual
floodwaters used by waterfowl hunters do not have to be designated
as navigable in the Harbors and Navigation Code to be recognized
as legally navigable by California courts.
This author has shown that under the current test for navigability
used by California courts, annual floodwaters can be navigable. The
validity of this conclusion is not affected by statutes or case law that
restrict the types of water than can be navigable. The author has
also shown that a constitutional right of public access to navigable
waters, whether based on the public trust or the right of navigation,
exists in the people of California. Thus, the people have the right
to navigate floodwaters on private land.
THE NAVIGATION RIGHT PROTECTS INCIDENTAL RECREATION RIGHTS
Since landowner consent is required under section 2016 when a
member of the public wishes to hunt on flooded lands and is not
required when that person wishes only to navigate across the flood-
waters, the law impedes only the right to hunt, and the navigation
right is unscathed by the statute.'30 Thus, even if proponents of sec-
tion 2016 concede the existence of a constitutional right to navigate
floodwaters, the argument could still be made on their behalf that
the statute is constitutional because it does not affect the right of
124. CAL. HRaB. & NAy. CODE §§101-106.
125. Id.
126. 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (lst. Dist. 1951).
127. Id.
128. 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585 (1936).
129. See CAL. HARE. & NAY. CODE §§101-106.
130. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text of the amended version of CAL. FISH
& GAmE CODE §2016.
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navigation per se, rather, the law impinges only on the right to hunt,
a right not protected by the constitution. This conclusion is erroneous,
however, because it does not comport with California case law,1''
and an opinion of the California Attorney General.' 3 2 Both of these
authorities hold the navigation right to embrace incidental recreational
activities.
A. California Case Law Interpreting Article X Section 4 Holds
Recreation Rights to be Protected by the Navigation Right
In Forestier v. Johnson,'33 the California Supreme Court found the
constitutional right of navigation to include the right to hunt. In
Forestier, the activity that the landowner sought to enjoin was naviga-
tion across Fly's Bay by persons hunting waterfowl.' 34 After concluding
that article X section 4 protected the defendant's right to navigate
the bay, the court turned to the issue whether the right of navigation
encompassed the right to hunt. The court found affirmatively that:
[H]unting... is a privilege which is incidental to the public right of
navigation .... The defendants .... having the right of navigation over
these waters, may exercise that right at will as a public right, and
if, in doing so, they find game birds thereon, they may, during the
lawful season, shoot and take them.' 35
This language makes plain the assertion that the privilege to hunt
is contained in, or is incidental to, the navigation right.
This conclusion was reached by the California Court of Appeal
in Mack.1 36 In Mack, the court interpreted the Forestier holding as
creating "an absolute right (in the public) to navigate and hunt in
small boats" on navigable waters.' 37 Further, the Mack court stated:
"It hardly needs citation of authorities that the rule is that a navigable
stream may be used by the public for boating, swimming, fishing,
hunting and all recreational purposes (emphasis added).' '131
The constitutionally based public trust easement over navigable water
also includes recreational rights under contemporary California law.
In Marks v. Whitney,' 3" a quiet title action between adjacent land-
owners, the California Supreme Court stated that in addition to the
131. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
133. 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 40, 127 P. at 162-63.
136. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3rd 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448. (3rd Dist. 1971).
137. Id. at 1048, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
138. Id. at 1045, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
139. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
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traditional uses protected by the public trust easement, the easement
also includes right to "fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating
and general purpose- the navigable waters of the state .....14 0
B. California Attorney General Considers Recreation Rights to
be Included in the Navigation Right
The Mack decision was relied on in an opinion by the California
Attorney General1 4' that stated that the right of navigation includes
incidental recreation rights, including hunting. The opinion was in
response to a query by an assemblyman whether a portion of the
Tuolumne River was navigable, and if so, what the ramifications were
in terms of title to the bed of the river and public access rights. 142
The opinion stated that regardless of whether the bed is in public
or private ownership, the public enjoys an easement over all navigable
streams in the state.'43 This easement, the opinion continued, included
the right of the public to exercise the incidents of navigation on the
water, namely boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, and other recrea-
tional uses. 4 4 Applying the Mack test for the navigability of a water-
way, the Attorney General concluded that the part of the river in
question was navigable and hence burdened by this public easement. 45
This opinion, together with the cases discussed above, makes clear
that the constitutional navigation right, which attaches to all navigable
waters in the state and hence to most annual floodwaters, includes
the right to hunt. The people of the state, therefore, have a constitu-
tional right to navigate floodwaters on public or private land to hunt.
This conclusion, however, appears to be in direct conflict with other
provisions of the California Constitution.
Article I section 1146 of the constitution creates an inalienable right
in the people to own land and protect the land from trespass. This
provision would seem to disallow unauthorized entry onto private land
and the taking of game thereon, acts allowable under article X sec-
tion 4. As will be shown, however, entry onto navigable waters over
private land to hunt does not constitute a trespass in derogation of
article I section 1.
140. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
141. 55 Op. ArT'y. GEN. 293 (1972).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 294.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 302.
146. CAL. CONST. art. I, §1.
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ENTRIES ON NAVIGABLE WATERS AND THE TAKING OF GA_E
THEREON DO NOT CONSTITUTE TRESPASSES
When a person enters onto private land by navigating floodwaters
and kills and takes a game bird, two possible trespasses to the land-
owner may occur: a trespass to the owner's land and a trespass to
the owner's waterfowl. Regarding trespass to land, P.G.&E. 7 made
clear that no entry, and hence no trespass can occur when a member
of the public traverses navigable waters over private land since this
land is burdened by a public easement.' 8 The constitutional right of
navigation does not create a right in the public to cross private land
to get to navigable waters, however, and this activity would constitute
a trespass.'4 9 The exercise of the navigation right over annual flood-
waters does not involve this type of trespass because most floodwaters
are accessible to public hunters from adjacent navigable waters and
does not involve travel by foot or vehicle over private land.'s° Thus,
the exercise of the constitutional right of navigation over annual flood-
waters does not constitute a trespass to land.
The taking of wild game by a public hunter once on floodwater
over private land arguably constitutes a trespass under section 656
of the California Civil Code.' 5' Under that section, wild animals can
be "owned" when the animals are on the land of someone "claim-
ing" them. 5 2 Under this section, duck hunting clubs that are organized
and which purchase land solely for the purpose of hunting game
arguably "claim," and hence own, the wildlife on their land. When
a member of the public shoots a "claimed" duck without the con-
sent of the landowner, therefore, a trespass to the owner's property
rights in the duck appears to occur. Decisions by the California
Supreme Court, however, reveal that this is not precisely the case.
In Kellogg v. King,'" the California Supreme Court was requested
to enjoin the trespasses by a large number of persons who were entering
onto land owned by a private hunting club.' 4 The defendants were
proven to have killed several of the waterfowl that frequented the
land and to have driven off many more birds. The court ordered
147. P.G.&E. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 253, 193 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1983).
148. Id.
149. Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 90 P. 532 (1907). Although this case was
decided before the liberal Mack test was announced, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1971), the Bolsa court makes clear that although a right may exist in the public to navigate
waters, the public may not lawfully cross private land to get to navigable waters.
150. California Attorney General Indexed Letter IL-75-246 (1975) at page 8.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE §656.
152. Id.
153. 114 Cal. 378, 46 P. 166 (1896).
154. Id.
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the injunction, holding that since the defendants had not been given
permission to enter the land to hunt, the landowner had rights in
the waterfowl under Civil Code section 656 superior to the rights of
the trespassers."' Thus, the court in Kellogg construed Civil Code
section 656 to create private property rights in wild game only as
against trespassers. As has been shown, entry onto private land by
navigable waters in not a trespass. Thus, under the Kellogg rationale,
no trespass to waterfowl can occur when a person shoots a duck from
navigable floodwaters over private land. This conclusion comports with
cases discussed earlier that hold wild game, while alive, to be public
property and incapable of private ownership. '56 The right to navigate
and hunt on navigable floodwaters, protected by article X section 4,
does not conflict with the inalienable property rights secured by arti-
cle I section 1 of the California constitution since no trespass to
property occurs in exercising the right to navigate floodwaters to hunt
waterfowl. The finding that no conflict exists between the rights pro-
tected under article I and article X section 4 is the final step in show-
ing that a constitutional right to navigate floodwaters to hunt is held
by the people of California.
SECTION 2016 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEYOND THE POWER OF
THE LEGISLATURE
The author has shown that a constitutional right of navigation,
whether called the public trust easement or simply the right of naviga-
tion, exists in California. This right, which includes the right to hunt,
attaches to all navigable waters in the state, whether the waters are
on public or private lands. Further, the author has shown that the
exercise of this right does not interfere with the property rights secured
to landowners by article I of the California Constitution. Further-
more, annual floodwaters of the type used by waterfowl hunters are
navigable under the current navigability standard used by California
courts. The conclusion must be reached, therefore, that the right of
the people to navigate floodwaters over private land to hunt is a right
protected by the California Constitution.
Although laws are presumed valid, those that impinge upon a con-
stitutional right in a manner that is beyond the power of the legislature
are unconstitutional.' 57 Section 2016 clearly impinges on the constitu-
tional right of navigation because thousands of acres of navigable
155. Id. at 388-89, 46 P. at 169.
156. People v. Truckee Lumber Company, 116 Cal. 397, 48 P. 374 (1897).
157. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912); People v. California Fish Co.
166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
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waters are no longer freely accessible to a large segment of the
public. 158 Laws exist, however, that constitutionally restrict the recrea-
tional use by the public of equally vast areas of navigable waters.",9
The proper inquiry in judging the constitutionality of section 2016,
therefore, is whether the legislature, in enacting the law, exceeded
the constitutional allotment of power to restrict access to navigable
waters.
The limits on the legislative power to restrict access to, and use
of, navigable waters arises from article X section 4 of the state
constitution. 6 ' This provision states that the legislature "shall enact
such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision,
so that access to the navigable waters of this state shall be always
attainable for the people thereof."' 6 ' This provision is a clear man-
date that the legislature, in taking action affecting the use of navigable
waters, may enact only those laws that ensure control over access
to and use of navigable waters is not placed in private hands. This
provision has been so interpreted by the California Supreme Court.
In People v. California Fish Co.,62 the court ruled on the validity
of patents of coastline from the state to private individuals. 63 The
court ruled that although the patents were valid, "section 2 of arti-
cle XV of the state constitution deprives the legislature of power to
dispose of tidelands fronting upon navigable water so as to entitle
the grantee to destroy or interfere with the public easement for
navigation."' Hence implicit in the grants was a navigational ease-
ment. Since the public trust has been extended to nontidal navigable
waters, 65 this language is applicable to laws dealing with those waters.
Thus, under article X section 4 the legislature is powerless to place
control over navigable nontidal waters, including annual floodwaters,
in private hands. Section 2016, therefore, which places control over
the exercise of the constitutional right of navigation in private hands
is beyond the power of the legislature and is unconstitutional.
158. See Chronicle Article supra note 2.
159. CAL. FIsH & GAME CODE §1580, for instance, allows the Department of Fish and Game
to create wildlife refuges containing navigable waters where hunting is banned. The distinction
between these laws and section 2016 is that under section 2016, access to navigable waters
is controlled by private persons whereas in section 1580, control over navigable waters remains
in a public agency.
160. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for the text of CAL. CONST. art. X §4.
161. Id.
162. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 598, 138 P. at 88.
165. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Although section 2016 is unconstitutional, the problems sought to
be remedied by the enactment of the law are real.' 66 This author of-
fers two solutions to the problems faced by owners of private land
annually flooded. One solution is the education of public waterfowl
hunters of the problems that are associated with free use of privately
owned flooded lands. This could be accomplished by dispersal of in-
formation by the Department of Fish and Game and hunting organiza-
tions. If the majority of public hunters realize that they are navigating
across private land, they will invariably be more respectful of the land-
owners property. Further, informed hunters will aid in discouraging
and apprehending the few public hunters that will cause damage to
private property. Second, the Department of Fish and Game and other
authorities should increase law enforcement activities on privately
owned flooded lands during the waterfowl hunting season. The ef-
fective enforcement of existing fish and game laws'67 can accomplish
the desired effect of section 2016 in a constitutional manner.
CONCLUSION
Nearly every winter in California, the rivers that flow into the
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys swell with rain, frequently spilling
over their banks onto adjacent land.' 68 These excess waters are also
diverted onto nearby land as a flood control measure.' 69 These flood-
waters, oblivious to property lines, inundate many acres of privately
owned land. The flooded lands attract a major portion of the water-
fowl that migrate through California. ' ° These waterfowl, in turn, at-
tract waterfowl hunters who navigate the privately owned flooded lands
in pursuit of the birds."' Over the years, landowners experienced prop-
166. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; see also Chronicle Article supra note
2 and California Attorney General Indexed Letter IL-75-246 (1975)(On file at the Pacific Law
Journa).
167. For example, CAL. Fisn & GAm CODE §2004 reads:
It is unlawful for any person, while taking any bird, mammal, fish, reptile, or am-
phibian, to cause damage, or assist in causing damage, to real or personal property,
or to leave gates or bars open, or to break down, destroy, or damage fences, or
to tear or scatter piles of rails, posts, stone, wood, or through carelessness or negligence,
to injure livestock of any kind.
Id.
168. See Chronicle Article supra note 2.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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erty damage caused by hunters who had not received permission to
hunt on the private land.'
Seeking to stop this damage, the California Legislature amended
section 2016 of the Fish and Game Code.' Section 2016, as amended
in 1982, requires the hunter to obtain landowner consent before en-
try can lawfully be made onto privately owned flooded lands." 4 The
result of this legislation has been to place control over access to
thousands of acres of prime hunting waters in the hands of private
individuals and corporations. This action effectively closes these waters,
some of which have been used for many years, to the public. 17 This
appears equitable because private landowners should not have to suf-
fer the damage caused by unauthorized entry onto privately owned
flooded lands. 176
In California, however, a strong public policy founded in the state
constitution, allows access to, and use of, navigable waters.' 1" This
right is protected by the constitution expressly, 178 and by the con-
stitutionally based public trust doctrine.' 79 This navigation right ex-
tends to all navigable waters of the state, including floodwaters,'
and embraces the recreational incidents of navigation,"8 ' including
hunting.'82
Although the amendment to section 2016 has a laudable purpose,
the statute is unconstitutional because the law places control over ac-
cess to navigable waters in private hands.' 83 The statute thus manifests
the very evil sought to be eradicated by article X section 4 of the
California Constitution.' 84 A statement by one of the proponents of
this constitutional provision, made in 1879 is relevant today in describ-
ing the action taken by the legislature when section 2016 was amended:
"The higher interest of the public has been disregarded, and the lesser
interest of individuals and corporations has had full sway."' '
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 18-32 for history and text of this statute.
174. Id.
175. See Chronicle Article, supra note 2, at col. 1.
176. Id.
177. CAL. CoNsT. art. X, §4. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for the text of
this provision.
178. Id.; see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 62-129 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
185. Debates and Proceedings of the California Constitutional Convention 1878-79, at 1481.
This statement was made by a Mr. Ayers. Id.
1984 / Public Access to Floodlands
Possible solutions exist to the dilemma faced by landowners over
whose land floodwaters flow and hunters hunt. Education of public
waterfowl hunters, designed to impress upon them the nature of the
problems encountered by landowners invariably would reduce the harm
suffered by landowners. Also, effective enforcement of existing Fish
and Game laws would reduce the amount of property damage occur-
ring on privately owned flooded lands.', In any event, the lands and
waters affected by section 2016 should not be closed to the public
because, as the California Supreme Court said in Lyon: 87 "Lands
of this type.. .constitute a resource which is fast disappearing in Califor-
nia; they are of great importance for the... recreational needs of the
residents of the state."' 88
Allen Robert Berrey
186. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
187. State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696,
cert. denied 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
188. Id. at 216, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
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